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hook or crook' escape the penalty of .fo\;,'iture.'· To hold
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declared intent"
that .the forfeiture-/ clause
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mentioned
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the pate !'lOliI1 t9proceed/witllea min~tration of the
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in this opinion,(piid in all !proc" am ~Mt~in the interests
of the i,?~nt contingent ~~tnai~erme ~,,' in~Iv~d the C?urt
shall r,.eq'111re that such mUlo~appear y a uardlan ad btem
and ~-()iinsel whose intereWare not in conflict with those of
the ,{,vards.

'0

--~bson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Carter, J., Traynor,
f,(J and Spence, J., concurred.

[ Crim. No. 5243. In Bank. Jan. 22, 1952.]

In re O. D. JAMES, on Habeas Corpus.
[1] Habeas Corpus-Petition-Excuse for Dela,. in Filing.-Even
if strict requirement of diligence in coram nobis proceedings
were a prerequisite of a writ of habeas corpus, petitioner's
affidavit and record of a coram nobis proceeding present
a satisfactory explanation of delay in filing a petition for
habeas corpus where it appears therein that because of his
ignorance petitioner did not realize that he had any grounds
for attacking a judgment of conviction until long after the
McK. Dig. References: [1] Habeas Corpus, § 51; [2] Habeas
Corpus, § 8; [3-5J Criminal Law, § 101; [6] Criminal Law, § 163;
[1] Criminal Law, § 1000; [8,9] Criminal Law, § 110; [10] Habeas
Corpus, § 18; [11J Habeas Corpus, § 68.
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time for appeal had expired, that because he could hardly
read or write he had no friends or acquaintances with whom
he could correspond, that he was dependent solely on prison
officials for any move in his behalf, and that finally, througb
the aid of a chaplain, he was able to get certain people interested in his case and thus receive competent legal advice.
ld.-Grounds-Violation of Constitutional Rights.-While a
writ of habeas corpus may not be used as a substitute for an
appeal, the writ will lie if fundamental constitutional rights
of the petitioner have been violated.
Criminal Law-Rights of Accused-Aid of Counsel.-Right of
an accused to counsel is a fundamental constitutional right
which has been carefully guarded by the courts.
ld.-Rights of Accused-Aid of CounseI.-Due process clause
of Fourteenth Ameqdment of United States Constitution requires counsel to be furnished to the accused in capital cases.
ld.-Rights of Accused-Aid of CounseI.-A state court is
required to initiate an inquiry into the desire of the accused
to be represented by counsel, to inquire into the ability of the
accused to procure counselor, in the event of the inability of
the accused to procure counsel, to assign competent counsel
to conduct his defense.
ld.-Preliminary Examination-Rights of Defendant-Aid of
Counsel.-Where one accused of murder is not represented on
the preliminary hearing by counsel, the failure of the magistrate to inform him of his right thereto is a violation of
Const., art. I, § 8, and Pen. Code, § 858.
ld.-Matters Preceding Sentence-Determination of Degree of
01fense.-Where defendant has pleaded guilty to a murder
charge, the court is required to take evidence for the purpose of
determining the degree of the crime. (Pen. Code, § 1192.)
ld.-Rights of Accused-Aid of Counsel-Waiver.-Assuming
that a plea of guilty in a capital case could be received in
1944 (prior to amendment of Pen. Code, § 1018) from a defendant who did not appear with counsel, a plea of guilty in
such case did not imply a waiver of the right to counsel.
ld. - Rights of Accused - Aid of Counsel- Waiver.-Court
cannot accept a waiver of counsel from one accused of a
serious public offense without first determining that he understands the nature of the charge, the dements of the offens!',
the pleas and defenses which may be available, or the punishments which may be exacted.

[3] See CaI.Jur., Criminal Law, § 83; Am.Jur., Criminal Law,
§ 167.
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[10] Habeas Corpus-Grounds-Violation of Constitutional Rights.
-A conviction of first degree murder will be set aside on
habeas corpus whert' defendant's conlStitutional rights were
violated because he was not informcd of his right to counspl
when firlSt brought before the magistrate, where a mere
statelllt'nt that he wished to plt'ud guilty was insufficient to
show a waiver of the constitutional guarantet', and whcre, ill
"iew of evidence indicating that the crime was less than first
degrt'e IllUl'der, it was unlikely that any attorney representing
him would have advised him to plead guilty to the murder
charge.
[11] Id.-Judgment-Discharge and Rema:!ld.-Although a judgment of conviction will be set alSide on habeas corpus for
wrongful denial of defendant's right to counsel, he will be
remanded to the custody of the sheriff of the county for
further proceedings where he is still subject to trial on the
charge made against him.

PROCEEDING in habeas corpus to secure release from
custody. Writ granted; petitioner discharged from custody
of prison warden and committed to custody of county sheriff
for further proceedings.
Adams & Reynolds for Petitioner.
Edmund O. Browll, Attorney General, and Clarence A.
Linn, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent.
TRAYNOR, J.-Petitioner, O. D. James, an inmate of San
Quentin State Prison. seeks a writ of habeas corpus. He
pleaded guilty to a charge of murder. The court determined
that the crime was first degree murder and sentenced petitioner to imprisonment for life. Petitioner now contends that
his constitutional rights were violated and his plea of guilty
vitiated because he was not given the aid of counsel.
Petitioner's version of the events leading to the homicide
are set forth in his affidavit. On December 2, 1944, a number
of farm workers were engaged in a dice game at the canteen
on the ranch where they worked. Petitioner and Chat'lie
Thomas, the decedent, wt're watching the game awaiting their
turns with the dice. Petitioner placed 55 cents in front of
him on the table in anticipation of hazarding that sum when
he gained possession of the dice. Thomas, who had not pre[11] Discharge on habeas corpus after conviction as affecting
claim or plea of former jeopardy, note, 97 A.L.R. 160. See, also,
Cal..Tur., Habeas Corpus, § 56 j Am ..Tur., Hnbens Corpus, § 154.
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vionsly wagered any money and had no claim to the coins.
suddenly snatched them. Petitioner demalliled that Thomas
\'eturn the money. 'rhey argued for about a minute and
Thomas then ran out a side door. At this point a bell rang
summoning the workers to supper. 'Vith the triple purpose
of avoiding the rush for the front door, responding to the
supper bell, and looking for Thomas, petitioner walked out
the side door previously used by Thomas. Thomas was waitiug outside, and petitioner again demanded his 55 cents.
Thomas thereupon struck petitioner on the head with a bef'r
bottle, stunning him and inflicting a bloody scalp wound.
Petitioner staggered back and reached down to pick up his
cap. As he did so he heard a shout" Look out" and saw that
Thomas was bearing down upon him with a knife. In the
struggle that followed, petitioner's hand was slashed and is
now marked by a large scar. He seized the knife and struck
Thomas in the neck, killing him. After his wounds were
attended to, petitioner retired to his quarters to await thf'
arrival of law enforcement officers.
It is unnecessary to decide whether this version of the
homicide is true. It is set forth simply to show that petitioner'
had a defense, which, if wholly or partially believed by the
trier of fact on a plea of not guilty, would lead to acquittal
or at most to a conviction of a lesser crime than first degree
murder.
Petitioner· appeared without counsel at the preliminanhearing on December 12, 1944. in the justice's court and
was not informed of his right to counsel. l Bill Watson. a
worker on the ranch, testified that Thomas and petitioner
had been at the dice table. that Thomas picked up some money
from the table, and that Thomas and petitioner had an argument oyer some money and "something about point eight." ,
As to what happened thereafter, he testified as follows:
"Q . . . . What did they do after you got in there? A. Well.
the bf'll rung for Suppf'r. Everybody was going out to eat.
so they went out the door and I went out th<' door. Q. ""'hic·h
door did they go out? A. The little door there on the side. . . .
Q. 'Which one went Ollt the door first? A. Charlie [Thomas] .
. . . Q. Did he go out the side door in a hurry or did he just
walk out slowly? A. He went out in a hurry. Q. When he
went out the side door in a hurry, did the defendant, O. D.
"rHF. COtTRT: You hnn' 110
DEFENDANT: No. THE COURT:

\

J

nttOTn('Y nt this tin\(', ha\'c
All right. Pro('l'('d."
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James, go out this same door? A. Yes, sir. He went outside.
Q. How close behind Thomas was he when ,he went out the
door? A. I don't know exactly. Q. Well, approximately.
Approximate it. About how far behind him? A. Well, I told
you the truth, I don't know, because they was going out to
supper there, you know, so I couldn't tell how close he went out
behind. Q. Did he go out in a hurry or did he just walk out
casually' A. Well, when he went out the door, he was going
out, he was just walking out. . . . Q. Did anybody else go out
that side door? A. I didn't see nobody. I went out the front
door there. . . . Q. Did you see Charlie Thomas at any time
after he had gone out the side door? A. No, sir. Q. You never
saw him again T A. Well, I seen him laying on the ground,
after I walked across to the mess hall there. . . . Q. How long
after he picked up the money was it that he left by the
side door T A. About five minutes. Q. He stood there with
the money in his hand five minutes before he left by the door T
A. I think it was five minutes. I don't know. I didn't have
no watch on me. Q. Well, as a matter of fact, did the defendant here O. D. James follow the man Charlie Thomas,
out the side door right away Y Did he go right out after he
went out T A. I don't know whether he went right out behind
him or not. All I know, he walked out the same door. Q. Was
that about the same time? A. Shortly after."
Felix Neal, another worker at the ranch, testified that he
had been shooting the dice, that he made his point, which
was eight, that he did not know anything about a side bet,
that the argument started when Thomas grabbed some money
from the table and that the argument continued for about
five minutes. As to what happened thereafter, he testified
as follows: "Q. Then what happened' A. Then they went
out-well, before they went out, I walked out, I started to
leave out of there, out of the room there. So they went out
and I don't know what happened. Q. Where were the two
men, Thomas and James when you left the eanteen' A. They
was inside that little small room there. Q. They hadn't gone
out yet' A. No. They started to leave out before I beat it
out; I left out. Q. Which door did you go out' A. The front
door. Q. Had they started to go out when you left? A. Well,
they had-they looked like they was going out. Q. Do you
know which door they headed for? A. No, sir. Q. Or started
to go out, A. I didn't see them. Q. They started to go out.
Who was going out first' A. Charlie. I think he started to
go out, something like that. Q. Did this man James follow
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him or not, do you know' A. Well, he went around the table
there. That is when I left there. Q. Who went around the
table T A. The defendant here. Q. Where was Thomas when
the defendant went around the table. A. Thomas! Q. Yes.
Charlie ThomaS. A. Charlie Thomas, oh, he was on this side
of the table, close to the small heater they got there. Q. Where
was James' On the same side of the table or the other side'
A. On the other side of the table. Q. That is when you
mean that James went around the tablet A. When he went
around the table, that is when I left. Q. Why did you leave
at that time' A. Well, because I was waiting for chow
time. . . . Q. Well, then, Neal, when you shot the dice and
made your point of 8, that is when Thomas grabbed the money,
is that rightY A. Yes, sir. Q. Then there was an argument
over it between Thomas and James' A. Well, I didn't-I ,
didn't understand if it was an argument, they made so much
fUss there. Q. You called it an argument. A. It sounded like
an argument about some money. Q. Is that when James went
around the tablet A. Yes, sir. Is this James here' Q. Yes.
A. Yes. Q. He went around the table after Charlie' A. Yes.
Q. Is that when you leftY A. Yes, sir, that is when I left.
I left out the front door. Q. Did you see Charlie after that!
A: No, sir, I didn't see him."
Albert H. Lopez, constable of the township, testified that
petitioner said that he had made a side bet with Thomas
on the fall of the dice and that the argument was over the
question whether Thomas had bet with or against the dice.
Lopez further stated that immediately after the homicide, ,
petitioner told him what happened, giving substantially the
same version as that set forth in petitioner's affidavit. No
other witnesses testified, and petitioner did not testify in his
own behalf.
At the arraignment in the superior court, on December 15th,
the court asked petitioner if he would like to have a lawyer
and petitioner replied that he would like to have one. 2 PetiI

'''Q. Now, is O. D. James your true name? A. Yes. Q. Are you
represented by counsel? A.. No. Q. By a lawyer? A. No. Q. Do JOu
want a lawyer to represent you? A. I would like to have one. Q. Do you
have any money to pay for a lawyer? A. No, not yet. Court: Well
Mr. Oziaa [an attorney present at the proceedings] will you represent
him for the purpose of arraignment with, however, the right to with·
drawal if you wish? Oziaa: Yes.••• Gibbs: If you are going to appoint
an attorney that should be done before the case is set. It might not be
an agreeable date for the attorney.•.• Court: The matter will be
continued one week from today for the appointment of an attorney."
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tioller then pleaded not guilty. The court continued the matter
one week for the appointment of an attorney.
Four days later Melvin K. Gibbs, Assistant District Attorney, and petitioner, again without counsel, appeared in
the superior court. Nothing was said by Gibbs or the court
about the order of continuance to December 22d, and no order
was entered advancing the case on the calendar. Gibbs told
the court that petitioner had sent a note asking to see him
and stating that he wanted to plead guilty. The trial court
asked petitioner if he wished to plead guilty and he replied
that he, did. The court then permitted him to withdraw his
plea of not guilty and to plead guilty. Gibbs then stated:
"If the Court please, it might-your Honor .might be able
now to fix the degree, that will take but a moment. In brief
the fact~ are that this defendant and the deceased were
playing dice at Griffen Ranch No.2. Some altercation arose
over the fact that the deceased person grabbed the money
from the dice game-:-that money did not belong to this defendant by the wayS-this defendant started after him, and
then the deceased man ran out the side door, followed by
the defendant. The defendant stated to me that then and there
he dropped his hat and as he reached to get it, the deceased,
Charlie Thomas pulled a knife on him; that this defendant
took the knife away from him, and thereupon proceeded
to stab him, and that stab wound caused the death. There is
no doubt in my mind but what it is murder in the first degree.
But those are the facts as I have outlined them, and including
the statement the defendant made." Gibbs then asked petitioner "Did you hear what I said T Is that about right?"
Petitioner replied "That is right." The trial court accepted
Gibbs' claim that the degree of the crime was first degree
murder, and the case was continued for determination of
the sentence.
On December 22d petitioner' came into court for sentence,
again without counsel. The court informed petitioner of the
several steps that had occurred in the proceedings, omitting,
however, petitioner's request for the appointment of counsel.
the continuance of the case for that purpose, and the special
appearance on the 19th and the change of plea. The court
fixed the punishment at life imprisonment. The court then
asked petitioner questions about his education, family background, military record, and work history.
On March 3, 1950, counsel for petitioner appeared in the
aThere was no evidence that the money did not belong to petitioner.
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Superior Court of Fresno County before the same trial judge
who had presided at the Dece~ber, 1944, proceedings for
hearing on a motion in the nature of a petition for a writ
of error cot'am nobis. The trial Judge denied the motion. On
September 18, 1950, the District Court of Appeal, Fourth
District, affirmed the order of the trial court on the ground
that petitioner's' contentions could not be determined on a
petition for a writ of error coram nobis. (People v. James,
99 CalApp.2d 476 [222 P.2d 117].) On July 17, 1951, petitioner filed an original petition for habeas corpus in this court.
(Cal. Co~t., art. VI, § 4; Pen. Code, § 1475.) The petition
appeared meritorious, and we entered an order to show cause
why the relief prayed for should not be granted. The attorney
general has filed the record on appeal in the coram nobis
proceeding; which'includes a full transcript of the proceedings
'
,upon the ori~inal commitment.
The attorney general, relying on People v. Adamson, 34
Cal.2d 320, 327 [210 P.2d 13] and People v. Shorb, 32 Cal.2d
502, 513 [197 P.2d 330], contends that the petition should
be dismissed without consideration of its merits for inadequate explanation of the delay in filing it. Neither case
is applicable, for both involved coram nobis proceedings.
[1] Even if the strict requirement of diligence in coram nobis
proceedings were a prerequisite of the writ of' habeas corpus,
petitioner's affidavit and the record of the 1950 coram nobis
proceeding present a satisfactory explanation of the delay,
It appears therein that because of his' ignorance, petitioner
did not realize that he had any grounds for attacking the judgment until long after the time for appeal had expired, that
because he could hardly read or write he had no friends or
acquaintances in the outside world with whom he could
correspond or who could press his cause, that he was dependent
solely on the officials at the prison for any move in his behalf,
and that finally, through the aid of a chaplain at the prisOn,
he ,vas able to get the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People interested in his case and .thus
receive cOJ;npetent legal advice. (See In re Jones, 88 Cal.App'.
2d 167, 169 [198 P.2d 520].)
.
[2] The writ of habeas corpus may not be used as a substitute for an appeal, but if fundamental constitutional rights
of the petitioner have been'violated the' writ will lie. (People
v. Adams01l, 34 Cal.2d 320 [210 P.2d 13] ,'In re Mcaoy, 32
Cal2d 73, 76 [194 P.2d 531] ; In re Wallace, 24 Cal.2d '933,
938 [152 P.2d 1] ; In re Bell, 19 Cal.2d 488, 494, 507 [122 P.2d

,J
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22].) [3] The right to counsel is a fundamental constitutional .
right, ,vhich has been carefully guarded by the courts of
this state. (In re McCoy, 32 Cal.2d 73 [194 P.2d 531] ; People
v. Manchetti, 29 Ca1.2d 452, 458 [175 P.2d 533] j People v.
Chesser, 29 Ca1.2d 815 [178 P.2d 761] j People v. Lanigan,
22 Cal.2d 569 [140 P.2d 24, 148 A.L.R. 176] j In re Jones,
88 Cal.App.2d 167 [198 P.2d 520] ; People v. Avilez, 86 Cal.
App.2d 289 [194 P.2d 829] j People v. Zammora, 66 Cal.App.
2d 166 [152 P.2d 180] j People v. McGarvy, 61 Cal.App.2d
557 [142 P.2d 92] ; see earlier cases collected in 7 Cal.Jur.
939, 973, 990.)
The accused has the right in criminal prosecutions in
any court whatever "to appear and defend, in person and
with counsel." (Cal. Const., art. I, § 13.) At the preliminary
examination the magistrate must inform the accused of his
right to counsel, ask him if he desires counsel, and allow
him a reasonable time to send for counsel. If the felony
charged is not punishable with death, the defendant may
plead guilty to the offense at the preliminary examination
in the presence of counsel. (Art. I, § 8.) These basic guarantees are supplemented by many provisions of the Penal Code.
When the defendant is brought before the magistrate, the
latter" must immediately inform him . . . of his right to the
aid of counsel in every stage of the proceedings." (Pen. Code,
§ 858.) "If the public offense charged is an offense not
punishable with death . . . while the charge remains pending
before the magistrate and when his counsel is present, the
defendant may, with the consent of the magistrate and the
district attorney or other counsel for the people, plead guilty
to the offense charged. . . . The foregoing provisions of this
section shall not be construed to authorize the receiving of
a plea of guilty from any defendant not represented by
counsel. " (Pen. Code, § 859a.) "If the defendant appears
for arraignment without counsel, he must be informed by the
court that it is his right to have counsel before being arraigned, and must be asked if he desires the aid of counsel.
If he desires and is unable to employ counsel, the court must
assign counsel to defend him." (Pen. Code, § 987.) In 1949,
after the proce~dings in the present case, Penal Code, section
1018, was amended to provide that no plea of guilty to a
felony for which the maximum punishment is death shall be
received from a defendant who does not appear with counsel.
[4] The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly

I
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stated that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amend·
ment of the United States Constitution requires counsel to
be furnished to the accused in capital cases. (Qllicksall v.
.lIich1:gan, 339 U.S. 660, 666 [70 S.Ct. 910, 94 L.Ed. 1188];
Gibbs v. Burke, 337 U.S. 773, 780 [69 S.Ct. 1247, 93 L.Ed.
1686]; Uveges v. Pennsylvania, 335 U.S. 437, 441 [69 S.Ct.
184, 93 L.Ed. 127]; Bute v. Illirw-is, 333 U.S. 640, 674 [68
S.Ct. 763, 92 L.Ed. 986] ; Williams v. Kaiser, 323 U.S. 471,
474 [65 S.Ct. 363, 89 L.Ed. 398]; Tomkins v. Missouri, 323
U.S. 485, 488 [65 S.Ct. 370, 89 L.Ed. 407] ; Powell v. A.labama,
287 U.S. 45, 71 [53 S.Ct. 55, 77 L.Ed. 158, 84 A.L.R. 527] ;
22 So.Cal.L.Rev. 259.) [6] A state court is required "to
initiate an inquiry into the desire of the accused to be repre·
sented by counsel, to inquire into the ability of the accused
to procure counsel or, in the event of the inability of the
accused to procure counsel, to assign competent counsel to
conduct his defense." (Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 640, 674
[68 S.Ct. 763, 92 L.Ed. 986].)
[6] The record shows that petitioner was represented by
counsel only for the purpose of arraignment and at no other
stage of the proceedings. Thus, in clear violation of the
express mandate of article I, section 8 of the California Constitution and of Penal Code, section 858, petitioner was not
informed of his right to counsel when first brought before
the magistrate. Moreover, the trial court did not inform
him of his right to counsel at the time it accepted his plea
of guilty, or even ask him if he waived the right to counsel
or if he no longer wished counsel as requested at the time
of arraignment. Nor did the court inform him of the possible
maximum penalty or of the possibility of there being different
degrees of the crime charged. Petitioner, an illiterate farm
laborer without previous encounters with the law or experience in the intricacies of criminal procedure, could hardly
be expected to comprehend the possible offenses and various
punishments involved in this homicide or to know how to
weigh, let alone present, the defenses available thereto. The
elements of murder and manslaughter, the distinctions between first and second degree murder and the principles
governing defenses to charges of such crimes are often difficult even for experienced judges and skilled practitioners
to apply. "The right to be heard would be, in many cases,
of little avail if it did not comprehend the right to be heard
by counsel. Even the intelligent and educated layman has
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SOIl!etilUe~ 110 Nkill in the sl'icuee of law. If charged
with (~rilllc, hc is incapable, generally,. of determining for
himst'lf whether the indictment is good 01' bad. He is unfamilillr with the rul('s of evidence. Left without the aid of
l'ounsel he lllay be put on trial without a proper charge, and
l·ondded upon incompetent evidence, or evidence irrelevant
to tlw issue or otherwise inadmissible. He lacks both the skill
anu knowledge adequately to prepare his defense, even though
he have a perfect one. He requires the guiding hand of
l'olUlsel at e"el'Y step in the proceedings against him. Without
it, though he be not guilty, he faces the danger of conviction
because he does not know how to establish his innocence.
If that be true of men of intelligence, how much more true is :
it of the ignorant and illiterate, or those of feeble intellect."
{lIr. Justice Sutherland in Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45,
li8-69 [53 S.Ct. 55, 77 L.Ed. 158, 84 A.L.R. 527].)
The record in this case is eloquent proof of the wisdom
of the observation that "the guiding hand of counsel is
needed lest the unwary concede that which only bewilderment
or ignorance could justify or pay a penalty which is greater
than the law of the State exacts for the offense which they
in fact and in law committed." (Tonikins v. State of Missouri,
:323 U.S. 485, 488 [65 S.Ot. 370, 89 L.Ed. 407].) Not only
the record, but even Gibbs' statement to the court, indicates
that the crime was less than murder in the first degree. It is '
difficult to believe that a lawyer representing petitioner
would have advised petitioner to plead guilty to murder or
pt'rmitted Gibbs' statement to go unchallenged.
[7] When petitioner's plea of guilty was accepted by the
trial court, the prosecution had yet to establish that he had
a deliberate intent to kill when he struck Thomas. (Pen. Code,
§§188, 189.) At no time did the court take any evidence
for the purpose of determining the degree of the crime, as
it was required to do (Pen. Code,§ 1192; People v. Mendez,
2i Ca1.2d 20, 23 [161 P.2d 929] ; In re Hough, 24 Ca1.2d 522,
534 [150 P.2d 448]; People v. Verdier, 96 Cal.App.2d 29
[214 P.2d 433] ; In 1'e Hammond, 24 Cal.App.2d 18 [74 P;2d
:308] ; People v. Hammond, 26 Cal.App.2d 145 [78 P.2d 1172]),
but dependt'd solely upon the opinion of the Assistant District
Attorney that it was murder in the first degree. There is no
evidt'llce that this killing occurred during the commission of
a felony, and the only evidence that might possibly indicate
premeditation is that petitioner followed Thomas outside the
canteen.
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The attorney general, relying on In re Tedfm'd, 31 Cal.2d
693 [192 P.2d 3], contends that by requesting to change his
plea. petitioner impliedly waived his right to counsel and is
therefore precluded from making his present contention that
he was deprh'ed of his constitutional rights. Unlike petitioner,
however, Tedford did not request counsel, nor was he charged
with a capital offense. The record showed that he was fully
aware of the nature of the proceedings and had an intelligent
conception of the consequences of his act. 'Under these cirf'lImstances it was held that a plea of guilty was sufficient
to waive the right to counsel. (In re Tedford, 31 Ca1.2d 693,
695 r192 P.2d 3) ; In re Jingles, 27 Ca1.2d 496 p65 P.2d 12] ;
People Y. Wan'cr, 93 Cal.App.2d 54, 57 [208 P.2d 724].)
[8] Even if it is assumed that a plea of guilty in a capital
('ase could be received at the time of petitioner's plea of 1944
(before the amendment to Pen. Code, § 1018, supra) from
a defendant who did not appear with counsel, it does not
follow that in such a case a plea of guilty implied a waiver
of the right to counsel. As the seriousness of the charge inereases. a purported waiver must be scrutinized with corresponding care. If a eapital crime is ('harged, as herein, the
mere statement that the accused wishes to plead guilty is
not enough to show a waiver of the constitutional guarantee.
[9] l\IoreoYer. the court ('annot accept a waiver of counsel
from anyone ae('used of a serious public offense without first
determining that he "understands the nature of the charge.
the elements of the offense, the pleas and defenses which
may be available. or the punishments which may be exaeted."
(People Y. Chessrr. 29 Ca1.2d 815. 822 [178 P.2d 761] ; UvegeR
'-. Pellllsyll'ania, 335 'U.S. 437, 440-441 [69 S.Ct. 184, 93 L.Ed
1271.) There was no attempt to make such a determination
in this ease. The record shows that defendant was an itinerant
farm hand. without formal edueation, without money, and
e"idently without previous experience with courts.
[10] RiJwe the procednre here wa.'! in dear violation of
petitioner's ('ollstitutional rights, the conviction must be set
aside. (111 rc .l[cCoy. 32 Cal.2d 73. 77 [194 P.2d 5311; In rc
,Jolle.~. 88 Cal.App.2d 167 fI98 P.2d 520] ; Uveges v. Pennsylt·ania. 335 U.S. 437 [69 S.Ct. 184, 93 L.Bd. 127] ; Gibbs v.
Burke. 337 U.S. 773 [69 S.Ct. 1247, 93 L.Ed. 1686].)
[11] Petitioner contends that if the judgment is void, he
"should be restored to his liberty." The eyidence at the preliminary hearing, howe"er, was sufficient to justify the ('om-
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mitting magistrate's concluding that a public offense had
been committed and that there was reasonable cause to hold
petitioner for trial. (Pen. Code, § 872; People v. McGee, 31
Cal.2d 229, 234 [187 P.2d 706] ; People v. Nagle, 25 Ca1.2d
216, 222 [153 P.2d 344].) The denial of petitioner's right
to counsel did not serve to acquit him of the offense charged,
and he is still subject to trial. (In re McCoy, supra, 32 Ca1.2d
73, 77; see Pen. Code, §§ 799, 1486; cases collected in 97
A.L.R. 160.)
On oral argument the deputy attorney general stated
that" an examination of the record convinces the Attorney
General's office that manslaughter was the greatest crime
committed by this Petitioner, and we are taking the laboring
oar in calling the matter to the attention of )he Governor,
asking for commutation of sentence to time served.' '. If petitioner were convicted of manslaughter on a second trial, his
confinement based upon the invalid 1944 judgment, together
with any time credits for good conduct earned thereon (Pen.
Code, § 2920), would be credited upon the new sentence for
the same criminal act. (Pen. Code, § 2900.1.)
The writ is granted, the return to the order to show cause
shall stand as the return to the writ, and the petitioner is
discharged from the custody of the warden at San Quentin
and committed to the custody of the sheriff of Fresno County
for further proceedings in accordance with the views expressed
in this opinion.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Carter, J., Schauer, J., and Spence,
.T., concurred.
EDMONDS, J.-Upon the hearing of a motion here characterized as "in the nature of a petition for a writ of error
coram nobis," the superior court denied James any relief
and that order was affirmed by the district court of appeal.
(People v. James, 99 Ca1.App.2d 476 [222 P.2d 117J.) The
facts upon which the present determination is based are taken
from the record of that proceeding. I concur in the con'The petition alleges that the Adult Authority has also recommended
commutation. "On April 21, 1949, the Adult Authority at its clemency
meeting held at Sacramento considered your affiant's application for
Commutation of Sentence and the said Adult Authority recommended to
the Governor that Commutation of Sentence to reduce the offense of
Murder first degree to Manslaughter be granted; that the eomplete
file was returned to the Governor's office on April 25, 1949, with this
recommendation, but as yet no aetion has been taken on this recommendation. ' ,

